Home Nonmilitary action Is the art of war relevant to maritime strategy?

Is the art of war relevant to maritime strategy?

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“The art of war” and the components of maritime strategy

The resource is the most important component of maritime strategy and contributes to its development and application. The resources of the State have a limit to spare for its forces. Saving resources is of crucial importance for the sustainable transformation of forces and the sustenance of operations.

War costs a nation a great deal. “Whoever wants to fight must first count on the cost.” “As you join the battle, seek a quick victory… There has never been a state that has benefited from a protracted war. »«…. If the campaign continues, state resources will not be equal to the strain. These Sun Tzu philosophies indicate an interdependent relationship between national resources, logistical strength, and the balance of power. History also reveals that “… victory went to the power best able to produce and organize materials and manpower for war.”

During World War II, the United States built and operated 67,952 ships (1940-1945). It numbered 1,099 ships and boats as of June 30, 1940. Japan had 451 ships and 332 sank during the war and could not repair the losses.

Balance of power

Achieving the maritime objective through the use of military means requires a favorable balance of power. “The factors in the art of war are: First: the calculations; second, the quantities; thirst, logistics; fourth, the balance of power; and fifth, the possibility of victory. The calculations are based on the field, the estimates of the quantities of goods available are based on these calculations, the logistic force is based on the estimates of the quantities of goods available, the equilibrium power is based on the logistics force and the possibility of victory is based on the balance of power. “

The Falklands War of 1982 showed how the UK’s consideration of the balance of power impacted its preparation for war. The terrain of the Falklands War is called “the fall of the terrain, the close distances, the difficulty of passage, the degree of openness and the viability of the terrain for the deployment of troops”; was quite unfavorable to the UK, which prompted enormous preparations to tip the balance of power in its favor. Maintaining the balance in favor required a superior application of combat power. It was both the superior focus and the application of combat resources that made the difference in the Falklands, the Pacific during WWII, and the Arab-Israeli wars.