An improvised explosive device (IED) is “an improvised placed or manufactured device incorporating explosive, destructive, fatal, noxious, incendiary, pyrotechnic, or chemicals designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They can incorporate military stores, but are normally made from non-military components. “
Over the past decade, a clear trend has been observed in the increased use of IEDs by armed groups. This increase has been accompanied by a worldwide decline in the production, stockpiling and use of commercially manufactured anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. These two factors combined have amplified the impact of improvised explosive devices as a category of explosive device (EO) on post-conflict situations. In many post-conflict environments, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, IEDs now claim more civilian lives than commercially manufactured landmines.
Contamination by improvised explosive devices after conflict creates an environment of lasting insecurity and hinders recovery. The use of IEDs against civilians affects all of their human rights, including the right to life, physical security, education and health. In addition, the socio-economic impact on the Sustainable Development Goals can be significant as IEDs hamper trade, contribute to internal displacement and refugee flows, hamper humanitarian responses and civil society activity, as well as the practice of good governance and reconstruction. Reducing the impact of IEDs involves close cooperation and coordination between the levers of diplomatic, rule of law, economic and information power to restrict or compromise their use, protect the population, strengthen their security freedoms and restore confidence. Mine action (MA) therefore plays an important role in facilitating the recovery of communities facing contamination by improvised explosive devices following conflict.
The GICHD has developed this guide to good practices for the disposal of FDI with the aim of sharing information throughout the ME sector to assist in safe, effective and efficient FDI search and disposal activities in as part of a broader IED MA authorization process. The guide provides technical content related to specific techniques and procedures, but is not intended to replace training or technical publications provided by equipment suppliers.
A single AM site contaminated with IED can encompass several different types of “space”; from buildings and other man-made structures to open areas, roads and confined spaces. Secondary hazards (such as oil and gas pipelines, gas stations, chemical containers, human waste, and power lines) can also contaminate these spaces, making survey and clearance tasks difficult. IEDs can be posed in defined patterns, such as those associated with conventional minefields, or in a more targeted manner to deny specific areas, protect supply routes, degrade demining operations or sow fear within the community. the local community. The technical “threat” of IEDs can also vary from “simple” to “complex” in a relatively small geographic area (the complexity depends on the capacity of an armed group and the availability of materiel), or it can be relatively constant. over a larger geographic area, such as improvised minefields designed to slow the advance of security forces during conflict.
This guide provides tools to mitigate risk and exploit opportunities to maximize efficiency in AM operations where IED elimination is performed. With such improvisation in design and complexity comes a requirement to employ techniques and procedures which provide assurance that “all reasonable efforts” have been made and that the specified clearance parameters have been and ultimately met. Although this is not a Quality Management (QM) guide, this publication provides a link to help explain “all reasonable efforts” in relation to authorizing IEDs.
This guide is intended to be used to inform the development of National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) at the organizational level, including staff training and IED policy. Importantly, due to the ‘improvised’ nature of IEDs, activities associated with a clearance process must also incorporate an effective threat assessment to be part of a larger platform from which nationally led responses. can be established. This is not only a threat assessment of the device itself, but also the potential threat surrounding the team’s work site. The threat assessment is also not tied to the tactical level – it should also be considered at the operational and national levels, such as determining the security environment in which the MA operates, and whether national support mechanisms are in place. in place to support activities. Based on information collected and analyzed by AM organizations, “threat assessment” builds confidence in decision-making at all levels.